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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Determining the Adequacy of Representation
in a Class Action
According to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it is
possible for a single representative to represent adequately a class of be-
tween three and four million members. The court in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin' held that a determination of the adequacy of representation
in a class action brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure2 should not hinge on quantitative elements.
Plaintiff, an odd-lot4 investor on the New York Stock Exchange,
brought a class action on behalf of himself and about 3.7 million other
odd-lot investors against odd-lot dealers Carlisle & Jacquelin and De-
Coppet & Doremus,5 and against the Exchange. Alleging that the two
firms conspired together to monopolize odd-lot trading and to fix the
odd-lot differential at an excessive rate in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act,' and that the Exchange failed its statutory duty under the
Securities Exchange Act of 19347 to adopt rules protecting odd-lot in-
vestors, he sought treble damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff was
the sole representative of the class in the action; his damages were es-
timated at seventy dollars.8
The trial court dismissed the action as to the class, holding that
plaintiff, as "sole representative" with only a "miniscule" interest, could
'391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Medina, J.).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an extensive treatment of the law regarding class
actions, see 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 561-72 (Rules ed. 1961, Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTzOFF];
3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01 to .24 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE].
2 391 F.2d at 563.
'The normal unit of trade on the exchange, usually 100 shares, is called a
"round-lot"; the term "odd-lot" refers to transactions involving fewer than the
full round-lot unit. Odd-lots are purchased through odd-lot dealers who charge a
per-share fee, called a differential, for their services. See C. ROSENBERG, STOCK
MARKET PRIMER 22-23 (1962).
' The two defendant firms handle about 99 percent of the odd-lot business on
the New York Stock Exchange. 391 F.2d at 559. For information regarding
odd-lot trading practices on which this suit is based, see SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, PT. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
171-202 (1963).
815 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
S15 U.S.C. §§ 78(f)(b), 78(f)(d) & 78(s)(a) (1964).' 391 F.2d at 564 n.8.
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not represent it fairly and adequately as required by the rule.' The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,"0 holding that "reliance on
quantitative elements to determine adequacy of representation, as was
done by the District Court, is unwarranted."" It noted that newly
amended Rule 23 had received "somewhat less than an enthusiastic re-
ception in the District Courts,"' 2 and called for a more liberal interpre-
tation:
If we have to rely on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class
then rely we must. The dismissal of the suit out of hand for lack of
proper representation in a case such as this is too summary a proce-
dure and cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of the new
rule.'3
The court observed that if Eisen were not allowed to bring the suit
as a class action, it was unlikely the claim could be litigated at all. It
reasoned that no odd-lot investor "would have sustained sufficient dam-
ages to warrant, as a practical matter, individual prosecution of his
claim."' 4 Defendants argued that a successful antitrust plaintiff could
collect reasonable attorneys fees despite his small damages, and thus
could individually seek a recovery. But the court regarded the possi-
bility of a significant award for counsel as too remote to make feasible
this method of pursuing the claim. 5
'Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). While holding
that "[t]his alone is enough for this court to make a determination that this
action cannot be maintained as a class action," the court gave other reasons:
plaintiff could not give the required notice because of financial prohibitions;
questions common to the class did not predominate over questions affecting in-
dividual members; fair and proper management of the suit likely would be impos-
sible. Id. at 150.
" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction and remanded
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing "on the questions of
notice, adequate representation, effective administration of the action and any
other matters which the District Court may consider pertinent and proper." 391
F.2d at 570.
1 391 F.2d at 563.
1 For an example of "less than an enthusiastic reception" to the new rule, see
School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001
(1967), where the court's disenchantment with the rule is readily apparent:
Such a radical extension by [sic] this Court's jurisdiction by the mere in-
action of a non-appearing, non-resident citizen is, in our view, unprece-
dented. . . . We have some doubt, too, of the propriety of a rule which
extends the binding, substantive effect of a judgment to absent, but 'de-
scribed,' class members as well as to 'identified' class members.
Id. at 1005.
12391 F.2d at 563.
"Id. at 566.
'5 Id. In a prior ruling that the trial court's dismissal of the class action in
Eisen was an appealable order, the court of appeals had held: "We can safely
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A small claimant such as Eisen is therefore limited, for all practical
purposes, to asserting his rights only through a class action. An analysis
of the typical case of this kind indicates that reliance on quantitative
standards for determining the adequacy of representation would prohibit
his use of this device also, thus entirely precluding him from litigating
his claim. In the small claimant situation, the wrongful conduct usually
causes minor individual damages to a large number of people. Since
each individual's interest is small, there is normally little enthusiasm for
attempting to vindicate the claims through a class action or otherwise.
Should some claimants attempt to bring such an action, they would
likely be few in number'6 and the amount of their interest would be rela-
tively insignificant.
There is a need then to provide the small claimant with some remedy.1 7
One of the avowed functions of the class action device is to "provide
small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which
would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation."" Reli-
ance on quantitative factors, however, precludes the use of the class ac-
tion by the small claimant thereby defeating a primary purpose of the
rule.
The general question of adequacy of representation in a class action
has assumed particular importance since the adoption of new Rule 23
in 1966. Eisen qualified for class litigation under subsection (b) (3) of
the new rule,'" which corresponds to the former "spurious" class action."
assume that no lawyer of competence is going to undertake this complex and
costly case to recover $70 for Mr. Eisen." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370
F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The court in
the present action regarded this earlier finding that a class action was Eisen's
only remedy as "law of this case" and binding upon it. 391 F.2d at 567. For an
argument similar to the one made by defendants here-and a similar result-see
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 391 F.2d at 563.
'7 See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); see generally Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contempo-
rary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHaI. L. REv. 684 (1941).
18 391 F.2d at 560. See also the comments in Advisory Committee's Note, 39
F.R.D. at 104 (1966).
" To bring a class action under new Rule 23 all the factors in section (a) of
the rule must be present:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition, at least one of the prerequisites listed in sec-
tion (b) must be met. Subsection (b) (3) arises when "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
19691
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Adequacy of representation was not considered crucial under the old
rule, since it was generally held that the spurious action was merely a
permissive joinder device and only those actually before the court were
bound by the judgment.21 However, under the amended Rule 23, all
members of the (b) (3) class are bound unless they request exclusion.2
Further, due process requires that absentee class members not be bound
unless they were adequately represented in the action.2" Thus, under the
new rule adequate representation of the class is required in all actions,
not only by the rule's own terms, 4 but also by this constitutional con-
sideration.
Courts in the past have looked at various factors to determine whether
or not representation of a class was adequate. 5 These included: (1)
whether the interests of the representatives conflicted with the interests
of the class;" (2) whether the likelihood of collusion was eliminated
so far as possible ;27 (3) whether the number of representatives was suf-
ficient as compared to the numerical size of the class;28 and (4) whether
the representatives' self-interest in the suit was substantial.2"
There are two distinct quantitative factors that can be singled out
from these traditional standards: (1) the number of representatives as
compared to the numerical size of the class, and (2) the amount of the
representatives' self-interest in the suit. In Eisen neither the district
court nor the court of appeals made any clear differentiation between these
two concepts, although each court apparently took both into account."
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy." Id. at 23(b) (3).
2 Under the former rule, the "spurious" category arose "when the character
of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is .. . several, and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a com-
mon relief is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 28 U.S.C. App. (1964). Com-
pare current FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
"See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B).
"See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
,FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
See generally 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 567; 3A MOORE 23.07.
"6 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) ; Anderson v. Moorer, 372
F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
"'See, e.g., P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 25 F.R.D. 264
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"See, e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Trac. Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
"See Aalco Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Laundry Linen & Towel Chauffeurs
& Helpers Union, 115 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App. 1938).
"The district court's language shows the two concepts intertwined:
Eisen's inadequacy as a representative of the asserted class is further under-
[Vol. 47
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These quantitative standards are not ends in themselves, but logically
may be viewed as objective indices that the more fundamental require-
ments of adequate representation are present. The number of repre-
sentatives as compared to the size of the class provides some evidence
that diverse interests among the class members are represented before
the court; the amount of the representatives' self-interest can reasonably
be viewed as a factor in guarding against collusion among the litigants.
Elimination of the use of quantitative factors will probably make
more difficult the task of determining adequate representation, but it
should not be allowed to detract from the fundamental criteria of such
representation. Indeed, although the court of appeals discarded the
quantitative tests, it retained the underlying elements they represented.
It made clear that a determination should still be made as to whether
plaintiff's claim is typical and his interests not antagonistic to those
of the remainder of the class, and whether the likelihood of collusion has
been eliminated so far as possible."- In addition, it suggested "that the
party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct
the proposed litigation."32 This consideration appears to be in keeping
with the court's practical approach to the problem: it was the attorney,
and not the plaintiff, who would in fact represent the interests of the
class in court. It has been suggested that problems will arise from the
use of the qualifications of the attorney as a test of adequate representa-
tion, since judges will be hesitant to state their belief that an attorney
is not qualified to conduct the litigation.' The trial court, rather than
scored by the obvious fact that his interest, as sole plaintiff, is miniscule
compared to the interests of the class as a whole. The number of plaintiffs
bringing a class action in relation to the numerical size of the class, of
course, should not be the sole basis for determining the existence or non-
existence of a class action; however, it can be a valid and important factor
in assessing plaintiff's ability to adequately represent an entire class ...
[I]t is impossible to assume that he alone with a comparatively miniscule
and limited interest in odd-lot transactions can represent that large a class,
many of whose members necessarily have larger and different interests.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court
of appeals, in condemning the use of quantitative factors, also failed to distinguish
the two concepts involved, at one point disapproving of "[1]anguage to the effect
that a small number of claimants cannot adequately represent an entire class . .."
and immediately thereafter noting that "one of the primary functions of the class
suit is to provide 'a device for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are
too small to justify legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a
group.'" 391 F.2d at 563. In the first instance, the court is talking about the
number of representatives, and in the latter, apparently the amount of the repre-
sentatives' interest is the factor considered.
31391 F.2d at 562-63.
Id. at 562.
" See Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action
1969]
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looking at the attorney's ability, should look instead at his economic
qualifications-"the ability of the attorney to spend a sufficient amount
of time and money to discover all the necessary facts, to line up expert
witnesses and to handle the other demands imposed by the proper conduct
of complex litigation." 4 The court in Eisen was perhaps alluding to
such factors by its assertion that the attorney should be "generally able
to conduct the proposed litigation."3 "
An added source of protection for the rights of absentees, as the
court noted, is found in Rule 23 itself, which gives the trial court ex-
tensive and flexible control over the class action.30 Thus, judicial
Ride: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
889 (1968).
Id. at 904.
'5 391 F.2d at 562. But see Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D.
559 (D. Minn. 1968), a decision that follows Eisen. There the court apparently
considered the attorney's abilities rather than his economic qualifications:
It is to be noted though that chief counsel for the Third Division plaintiffs is
an experienced antitrust lawyer, having only recently left the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice. He represents the second largest city in
Minnesota, a large school district, two significant housing authorities, and
now the Metropolitan Airport Commission. It is apparent that his repre-
sentation will be fair, adequate and prosecuted with vigor.
Id. at 567-68. Here is the way the court in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), handled the problem:
Until the contrary is demonstrated, courts will assume that members of the
bar are skilled in their profession. In point of fact, irrefutable evidence of
his competence and fervor is reflected in the papers and arguments thus far
submitted by the plaintiff's attorney. He has demonstrated that he is both
willing and competent to undertake the responsibilities which this litigation
entails.
Id. at 496.
36391 F.2d at 564. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), (d), (e). The court's order
allowing the action to be maintained as a class action "may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c). The court may require
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair con-
duct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may
direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the pro-
posed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or otherwise come into the action. ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2). The court may "impose conditions on the representa-
tive parties or on intervenors. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (3). Court approval
of any settlement or compromise is required. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
Still another way that the interests of absentees are protected in class actions
is through the requirement of initial notice of the action to absentees. New
Rule 23 requires a particular standard of notice for actions brought under sub-
section (b) (3).
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort ....
[VCol. 47
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supervision as well as representation in advocacy is provided to safe-
guard the interests of the classy However, the elimination of the use
of quantitative factors, by taking away easily applied criteria, may tend
to cause the courts to rely too heavily on these powers given them under
the rule. The consequent danger is that they may fail sufficiently to
assess the representatives' qualifications, thereby not only undercutting
the function of the class representatives, but also imperiling the court's
own role as impartial arbiter of the litigation.
This tendency already is apparent in recent cases brought under new
Rule 23 (both before and after Eisen), where despite a wide divergence
of views as to what standards the representative must meet, emphasis is
uniformly placed on the power of the court to protect absentees. In
Dolgow v. Anderson,3" it was held that plaintiff must share the interests
of the class and must be willing to "put up a real fight"39 to qualify as
representative, while the court noted it had "a broad range of discretion
to assure adequacy of representation according to the individual circum-
stances of every case."' 40 In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,41 adequacy of
representation was seen to depend on the size of the class and the nature
of the action, and the uniqueness of the relationship between the repre-
sentative and the class. Reliance on overly stringent standards was not
deemed necessary, "for it underestimates the ability of a court to safe-
guard the interests of all parties."'42 In an action brought by the former
owner of two of some 4,700 shares of stock which allegedly were fraud-
ulently purchased from about 1,000 minority stockholders, the court
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). The trial court in Eisen interpreted the standard to
mean, under the facts there, that published notice would not be acceptable. Since
other forms of notice would be financially prohibitive, the district court ruled
that the suit could not continue as a class action. The court of appeals, however,
suggested that published notice might be acceptable, "particularly where require-
ment of a different form of notice would, in effect, prevent potentially meritorious
claims from being litigated." Id. at 570. A thorough analysis of the notice prob-
lem in Eisen is beyond the scope of this note; it is discussed in Comment, note
33 supra. See also Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based Upon Securities
Frauds Under the Revised Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 35 FORD. L. :R.v.
295, 309-11 (1966), where it is suggested that adoption of the trial court's view in
Eisen of the notice requirement would make large class actions impossible; and
see Note, Proposed Ride 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629 (1965).
3TSee generally, Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 199-295 (1950).
843 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
"Id. at 494.
'OId. at 496.
" 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
°Id. at 727.
"Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co. of America, 43 F.R.D. 169 (D.S.D. 1967).
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questioned plaintiff's ability to represent the class on the basis of either
of two factors, "be it the number of plaintiffs in relation to the number
of claimants or the interest of the plaintiff in relation to the interest of the
group... ."4 The court allowed plaintiff to represent the class, however,
because "if, at a later date, sufficient doubt is raised as to the adequacy of
representation, this court is empowered to act accordingly. 4' In Kronen-
berg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, I1c.,4 1 the court allowed plaintiffs to
represent the class: "At this juncture, it cannot be said that the named
plaintiffs do not adequately represent the class. In any event, the power
remains with the court to insure the adequate representation of the
class.""
The reliance on the court's power to protect absentees is apparent in
these cases, as is the lack of clearly defined standards to determine the
plaintiff's ability to adequately represent the class. With the discarding of
the use of quantitative factors, it will now be necessary for the court to
analyze closely at the outset of the action the scope and the interests of
the class, and the interests and abilities of the representatives, so that
the two may be compared and a reasonable assessment made of the rep-
resentatives' ability to protect the absentee class members. Such a de-
termination by the court of the representatives' qualifications should be
considered essential in all class actions. In this way greater reliance can
be placed on the representatives to protect the class during the course
of the litigation; the court will be left with a lesser role in this area,
thereby minimizing any jeopardization of its traditional impartiality.
Eisen presents an especially difficult situation for use of the class ac-
tion device in view of the obvious problems in managing and adminis-
tering so large a class.4 Nevertheless, the decision should open the way
for greater utilization of Rule 23 where there are numerous class mem-
bers, all with small claims. And if a comprehensive evaluation of the
class representatives' qualifications to represent the class is made by the
court, there should be no lessening in the protection afforded absentees.
JOHN M. MURcHIsoN, JR.
"Id. at 174.
I0d.
4041 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
,7 Id. at 46.
"' The problems of administrating such an action as the Eisen case led dissent-
ing Chief judge Lumbard to describe it as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a
class action." 391 F.2d at 572.
[Vol. 47
